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Notes and Comments
CONFESSIONS IN THE CUSTODY OF A POLICE OFFICER:
IS IT THE OPPORTUNE TIME FOR CHANGE?
Arghya Sengupta*
This paper reviews the law relating to confessions in the custody of
a police officer, as prevalent in India and the United Kingdom. It
arguesfor changing the law as it stands today in India, by making
confessions admissible in law, provided certain procedural
safeguards are put in place. In outlining the proposed model, the
paper draws on statutory provisions on this point in the United
Kingdom, and seeks to incorporate analogousprovisions in India.
This change, as the paper recommends, is in the final analysis, both
sound on principle and efficacious in practice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the several purposes of a criminal justice system is to ensure that the
guilty are brought to justice. However, in determining the existence of the guilt of
alleged offenders, several succinctly defined rules of evidence have been
incorporated in the system, which look to concretise procedural regularity in the
interest of the general populace. Hence, the object of punishment must be

harmonized with the object of adoption of fair means, as mandated by the law of
evidence.2 One important aspect of this balancing act pertains to confessions made

*

III Year, National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
Ernest Williams, The Modern View of Confessions, 3o LAw Q. REv. 292, 298 (1914).
Id.
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while in the custody of a police officer, an oft-debated subject, especially in the
context of the recent judgment in the ParliamentAttack case3 This article will
look into the contrasting approaches to this complex issue adopted in India and
the United Kingdom, and will analyse why the former has allowed its procedural
law of evidence to override the substantial law of determining the guilt of the
individual, while the latter has traversed the opposite path.
In pursuance of these objectives, the first part of this paper analyses the
differing approaches towards the issue of admissibility of confessions in the two
jurisdictions, and the rationales which underlie the distinct stances adopted. The
second part elaborates on the distinctions in the general principles by adverting
to the legislations governing the subject matter of confessions in the United
Kingdom and in India, in order to comprehend the nuances of the statutory
manifestations of these differences. Finally, the paper analyses the concept of the
admissibility of evidence of subsequently confirmed facts elicited as a result of
confessions in police custody, and the extent to which this exception militates
against the general principle of confessions in both the jurisdictions. In this light,
this Part assesses whether there is a necessity for such a provision in either of the
legal systems. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis, the author draws conclusions
as to whether there is a need for change in the Indian law relating to confessions
made in police custody.

IL.

RATIONALE FOR INADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS

Confessions< by an accused, made to a police officer, or to another person
while in the custody of a police officer, are as a rule inadmissible under the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 ("I.E.A."). Section 25 of the Act renders confessions made to
a police officer inadmissible as evidence whereas section 26 is wider in its purview,

3 State (National Capital Territory of Delhi) v. Navjot-Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005)
11 S.C.C. 6oo. [hereinafter ParliamentAttack].
4 The term "confession" has not been defined in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. An
accepted definition is the one provided by Lord Atkin in PakalaNarayana Swami v.
Emperor, A.IR. 1939 P.C. 47, 52, wherein he stated:
A confession must either admit in teims the offence or at any rate
substantially all the facts which constitute the offence.
On the other hand, the acknowledgement of certain facts, which fall short of
establishing the offence proved, that is, that which does not prove the guilt of the
accused, is an admission. See Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla, (1998)
3 SCC. 410, 437.
32
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and excludes all confessions made while in the custody of a police officer.- The
ambit of the latter is wider than the former since it also excludes confessions to
third parties, if there is a suspicion that the person making was in a position
amenable to the influence of a police officer.6 The broad reasoning for the enactment
of these sections was to prevent the practice of torture, extortion and oppression,
which was rampantly employed by the police in order to extort confessions.?

Hence, they are based on the assumption that a confession made to the police
officer may suffer from the impairment of want of genuineness, as there is a high
degree of probability that the same was not voluntarily procured.8 However,
while torture must undoubtedly be condemned, law makers must not lose sight of
the fact that inadmissibility of such confessions is the ultimate fallout of their
purported unreliability, which is the root malaise that they must look to cure,
instead of being satisfied with merely making such confessions inadmissible.
The United Kingdom has sought to cure this malaise by examining
confessions in light of their credibility.9 Torture, fear, inducement, oppression
are all seen as means of undermining the reliability and credibility of confessions.

5 I.E.A., §. 25:
No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person
accused of any offence.

I.E.A.,

§.

26:

No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate shall
be proved against such person.
6 RATANLAL N DrvAAL's THE LAw oF EvIDNCE 106 (Justice Y.V. Chandrachud ed., 20o2)
[hereinafter RTALAL & Dnmuout].
7
The rationale for this has been explained in the i" Report of the Indian Law
Commissioners which inter alia stated:
The evidence taken by the Parliamentary Committee on Indian
Affairs ...abundantly show that the powers of the police are often abused
for purposes of extortion and oppression; and we have considered whether
the powers now exercised by the police might not be greatly abridged...
Citedfrom SARKAR ON EvIDENcE 497 (Sudipto Sarkar ed., 1999).
* The notorious fact that confessions in India are largely obtained by police deceit and
torture has been noted in several judicial decisions. See, e.g., Nandini Satpathy v.
P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 S.C.C. 424, 428; Queen v. Bepin Behari DeV, 2 C.W.N. 71;
Jagjibon Ghose v. Emperor, 13 C.W.N. 861.
Sir William Scott's judgment in Williams v. Williams, (1798) 1 Hag. Con. 299, 304,
cited from Caoss &TAPPER ON EVIDENcE 6o6 (Colin Tapper ed., 1999) [hereinafter CRoss &
TAPPER]. See also PIPsoN & ELUOT, MANUAL OF THE LAw oF EVIDENCE 183 (D.W. Elliott ed.,
2001).
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Hence the judiciary is given the discretion to not allow confessions which have
been engendered by any form of coercion, oppression, or other means that make
the reliability of such confessions suspect' 0 This principle of English Law focuses
on the humanness of the means employed, and is simultaneously effective in
reaching the ends of delivering justice, by taking into consideration all voluntary
confessions. Therefore, this approach deserves to be commended. In Indian law
on the other hand, there is a well-entrenched distinction between admissibility
and reliability. However, these two concepts are inextricably intertwined, when
discussed in relation to the law of confessions. The author believes that, in light of
this blurring of differences in relation to confessions, Indian law should follow its

a

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 [hereinafter P.A.C.E.], § 76:
(1) In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be
given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in
issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of
this section.
(2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in
evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the
court that the confession was or may have been obtained(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession
which might be made by him in consequence thereof;
the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against
him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond
reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be
true) was not obtained as aforesaid.
(3) In any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence
a confession made by an accused person, the court may of its own motion
require the prosecution, as a condition of allowing it to do so, to prove that
the confession was not obtained as mentioned in subsection (2) above.
(4) The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of
this section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence(a) of any facts discovered as a result of the confession; or
(b) where the confession is relevant as showing that the accused speaks,
writes or expresses himself in a particular way, of so much of the confession
as is necessary to show that he does so.
(5) Evidence that a fact to which this subsection applies was discovered
as a result of a statement made by an accused person shall not be admissible
unless evidence of how it was discovered is given by him or on his behalf.
(6) Subsection (5) above applies(a) to any fact discovered as a result of a confession which is wholly
excluded in pursuance of this section; and

34
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English counterpart, and examine the degree of credibility of evidence, as a
precondition to any test of admissibility.

III. PRESUMPTION

OF UNFAIRNESS OF POLICE ACTIONS

Laws relating to confession, however, cannot be viewed solely through the
prism of principle; their efficacy in policy must be simultaneously considered.
Hence, while there is need to delve into statutory nuances, it is equally important
to assess whether these provisions are actually workable in practice or not. United
Kingdom's efforts to legislate a law on confessions, have displayed a singular focus
on regulating the process of police interrogation." From the early 2 0 t century,
there was a marked movement away from the strict "voluntariness" standard of
admissibility of confessions. This standard was based on the view that a voluntary
confession is creditworthy, since its genesis lies in a strong sense of guilt, and

"

(b) to any fact discovered as a result of a confession which is partly so
excluded, if the fact is discovered as a result of the excluded part of the
confession.
(7) Nothing in Part VII of this Act shall prejudice the admissibility of a
confession made by an accused person.
(8) In this section ~oppression" includes torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting
to torture).
(9) Where the proceedings mentioned in subsection (1) above are
proceedings before a magistrates' court inquiring into an offence as
examining justices this section shall have effect with the omission of(a) in subsection (1) the words "and is not excluded by the court in
pursuance of this section", and
(b) subsections (2) to (6) and (8).
The significant legislation in this regard has been P.A.C.E., which was enacted to
allow the court to correct the unfairness arising in the criminal trial process, by
allowing otherwise admissible evidence to be excluded from the prosecution case in
its substantive sections relating to confessions. This functions in tandem with the
Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police
Officers [hereinafter Codes of Practice], issued thereunder, and incorporated in § 66,
P.A.C.E., which provides an exhaustive regulatory framework positing rules for
every step of the interrogation process. The impetus, hence, is to concretise standards
which must be adhered to by the police while questioning suspects and accused
persons. The novelty of this approach is that instead of disallowing incriminating
statements made by the accused, it looks to nip the problem in the bud, by preventing
police officers from posing such questions, answers to which would be potentially
violative of the rights enjoyed by the accused. For more on the legislative history of
P.A.C.E., see generally CRoss & TAPPER, supra note 9, at 617-624, 629-637.
35
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hence, it can be admitted as evidence. As opposed to this, an involuntary
statement is the product of a false hope being held out to the accused tempting
him/her into the confession." A need was felt to prevent threats and coercion,
which were perceived to be the root cause of tainted confessions. Hence, the
initial change was to adopt a blanket approach rendering all confessions obtained
as a result of a suspicion of a threat or inducement inadmissible.'3 In its formulation
however, the test rode roughshod over the potential reliability of a confessional
statement, and ended up determining its admissibility on issues of form rather
than substance. Subsequently however, the procedure adopted looked to couple
the need for reliability with the objective of curtailing police excesses. The case
which marked the beginning of this approach was Ibrahim v. R.,4 in which Lord
Sumner emphasised the need for credibility being the cornerstone for admissibility
of confessions, an end which necessarily involved the curtailment of police
atrocities. Simultaneously however, there was a progressive liberalisation as far
as acceptance of aggressive police techniques went, and the high watermark of
this phase was marked by the decision in D.P.P. v. Ping Lin." The zenith of this
trend was marked by the fact that a presumption of fairness to police actions
evolved, which was however tempered by the concomitant creation of a standard
of oppression which would render a confession inadmissible? This is embodied
in section 76, P.A.C.E., which is the ruling position of law today.

"

14

The most illustrative case applying the voluntariness standard is R. v. Warickshall,
168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783), cited from CROSS & TAPPER, supra note 9, at 604.
Under this approach, if a confession was a consequence of a threat or promise, the
same would suffice to exclude the confession, with no credence attached to its potential
reliability. See, e.g., R. v. Knight, 21 T.L.R. 310, citedfrom CRoss & TAPPER, supra note
9, at 6o5. However, this approach quickly fell out of favour as the necessity of
pretrial police investigations became imperative, and a presumption of fairness was
attributed to this process.
*
[1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 874, 877-879.

IS This approach soon became crystallised when permitted techniques to elicit
information and the consequent issue of admissibility of the same became a part of
the Judges' Rules, first issued in 1912, which were drafted to guide police officers in
their task of questioning pretrial suspects. See Ian Brownlie, Police Questioning,
Custody and Caution, 1960 CRIM. L, REv, 298, 298-99.
6 [19751 3 All E.R. 175. In this case the accused had been charged of drug possession.
On the assurance of the police officer that if he identified the name of his supplier his
sentence may be reduced by the judge, he disclosed the details of his supplier. The
confession was held to be admissible despite inducement as the extent of police action
to elicit the confession was held not sufficient to cast a doubt on its creditworthiness.
17 The term "oppression" entered case law in the landmark case of Callis
v. Gunn, [19631
3 All E.R, 677. However, its definition remained vague and ambiguous See ROYAL
COMMIssION ON CRMINAL PRoCEDuRE, THE INVESIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES IN
ENmunr AND WALES: THE LAw AND PROcEDuRE 11 471-4.72 (1981).

Confessions in the Custody of a Police Officer
Section 76, P.A.C.E. dispensed with the mandatory exclusion of confessions,
together with placing the burden squarely on the prosecution, to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, that unfair means had not been employed in eliciting the
confessions sought to be relied upon.," From a plain reading of the section it
becomes clear that on principle, confessions made while in the custody of a police
officer are admissible as evidence in court. As far as the conditions under which
the bar operates are concerned, the focus is on ensuring reliability. To this end,
confessions engendered through oppression or any other means, which
compromise on reliability, will be inadmissible.9 The definition of oppression
given in section 76(8) has been borrowed from Article 3 of the European
Convention of Human Rights 1950, which proscribes torture or inhuman and
degrading treatment. Further the use of violence, in order to constitute
oppression, must be a substantial application of force extending beyond mere
battery.20 In sum, it is an action epitomising wickedness and improprietyY The
other means that render confessions inadmissible under section 76(2)(b),
essentially refer to any other circumstances which may shroud the reliability of
the confession in suspicion, such as something said or done which is external to
the accused. Further, in order to be admissible, a confession must also satisfy the
overriding test of section 78, which gives judges the discretion to exclude evidence
on the basis of other statutory provisions.22 With the evidentiary burden being
placed on the prosecution to show the lack of oppression and the fairness of the
methods employed in the eliciting the confession, the author feels that the balance
between the public interests of conviction and the systemic interests of
safeguarding procedure has been maintained . This has been supplemented by

is
19

Supra note to.

A complete bar on admissibility of such confessions, based on the premise that the
same would be obtained by tainted methods, is not operative in United Kingdom.
Judicial decisions under P.A.C.E have shown that the number of confessions rendered
inadmissible as a consequence of this standard being imposed is not significant. This
is primarily because the word "oppression" has been viewed by the courts as an
extreme standard, and they have been reluctant to broaden its ambit. See R. v.
Fulling, [1987] 2 All E.R. 65, where the Court of Appeals held that oppression is the

word which best manifests detestability and wickedness. See also R. v. Seelig, [1991]
4 All E.R.
2o

421,

in which the Court refused to consider cases of compulsory

interrogation as oppressive.
CRoss & TAPPER, supra note 9, at 618.

21 This is because § 76, P.A.C.E., has rejected the common law approach to oppression,
since it is a codifying act and has to be interpreted according to its natural meaning,
and without any connotations provided by previous law. See Fulling, supra note 19.
22 LH. DENis, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 198 (2002).
2
It is important to note that exclusion of evidence, when not directly possible under
§76, can be brought under H§ 78 and 82, PAC.E. § 78 provides:
37
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the Codes of Practice,24 which seek to mitigate police excesses through mandatory
internal disciplinary norms for the police. Thus in Britain, the Parliament has
taken a reasoned and consistent stand as far as confessions are concerned. It is
cognizant of the utility of confessions in any prosecution case, but aware at the
same time, of potential abuses of police power leading to violation of the rights of
the accused. It has also not been myopic in its view and limited its prohibitive
measures to police impropriety, but has placed the major thrust on ensuring
credibility. Though sound on principle, in the opinion of the author, it is however
contingent on a police force effectively fettered by checks and balances. Hence,
such an approach will only be successful in those societies where the police
exercise restraint and humane, either intrinsically or owing to external constraints.
In India, on the other hand, the presumption of police excesses in eliciting
confessions continues to weigh heavily with the legislators, presenting a seemingly
insurmountable obstacle to the development of the law of confessions. Hence,
confessions, whether made to a police officer by an accused, or by any person
while in police custody, are inadmissible as evidence in court, by virtue of sections
25 and 26, I.E.A 2 5 Thus in its scope and ambit, these provisions of law reflect a

(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which

the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that,
having regard to all the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained,
the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a
court to exclude evidence.
(3) This section shall not apply in the case of proceedings before a
magistrates' Court inquiring into an offence as examining justices.
§ 82 is the general provision for the power of courts to exclude evidence. It reads:
Nothing in this Part of this Act shall prejudice any power of a court to
exclude evidence at its discretion.
24
25

Supra note 11.
The reasoning behind the same primarily is that confessions made before a police
officer may be coerced, and hence would not be reliable enough to be adduced as
evidence before the court, and would inevitably fall foul of § 24, I.E.A., which is a
general provision prohibiting confessions prompted by inducement. This presumption
is more empirical and cultural rather than being necessarily on principle. Its genesis
lies in the general cynicism with which police practices are viewed in India, and has
been noted by several authorities. See MONIR, PRINcES Ao DIGEST OF THE IAW OF EVIDENCE
307 (Deoki Nandan J. ed., 1999) [hereinafter MoNiR]; RATANLAL & DHIRALAL, supra note
6, at 102. However, for a nuanced distinction between junior and senior police
officers, and the consequent restriction of inadmissibility of confessions made before
the latter only, see LAw CoMMIssioN OF INDIA, 69" REPORT ON THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACr, 1872 11
ii.i6-1.18 (1977).

38

Confessions in the Custody of a Police Officer
legislative intent to proscribe third degree methods being used by police officers,
and to ensure lawful and true evidence being presented, instead of allowing the
police "to sit comfortably in the shade, rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's
eyes rather than go about in the sun hunting up evidence."26
Section 26 serves as a comprehensive bar on extra-judicial confessions,
made while in the custody of a police officer. A confession in the presence of a

Magistrate, on the other hand, is admissible, as the judicial officer is deemed to
offset any potential for abuse of police power. This is, however, subject to the
procedure laid down in section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Section 26 is wide enough to render inadmissible the confession of any person,
irrespective of his being an accused, or not.2 The only important criterion which
has to be fulfilled for the section to be attracted is that the confessor must be "in
the custody of the police officer." This term does not merely connote custody
after formal arrest of a person, but also includes situations where a person is
under the surveillance and control of the police, as well.
Thus, these sections are wide in their ambit, and by their combined
operation, exclude certain confessions from admissibility, not because they are
necessarily presumed untrue, but because the means of their elicitation may have
been tainted.3o These sections are also instrumental in fructifying the operation of
section 24A' as the gravest possibility of confessions being induced by threat or
other means is while in police custody, or when being made to a police officer. An

=6 J. STEPHEN, A HisTORY OF CRiMINAL LAw IN ENGLAND 442

(1883), cited from Fred Inbau,

Should we Abolish the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incyrnination, 45 J. CRua L,
CRmIfooY & PoucE Sa. 18o, 182 (1954).
27

Ariel v. State, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 15.

28

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1125; Rambharose

Kachhi v. Emperor, A.LR. 1944 Nag. 1o5. In these cases it was held that any
confession made by any person to a police officer would be barred from admissibility
under § 26, LE.A. The only qualification, however, would be that he must be in the

custody of a police officer while making the statement. This section is hence
complementary to § 162, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which prohibits evidence
tendered to a police officer from being signed by the witness and admitted in Court.
Deoman Upadhyaya, id.; R. v. Mg Lay, A.LR. 1934 Rang. 173; Paramhansa v. State
of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 Ori. 144.
30 Deornan Upadhycya, supro note 28.
3 I.E.A., § 24 reads:
24. A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal
29

proceeding if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have

been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to
the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in
39
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exception, however, in the interests of national security, has been authorised by
the courts, albeit reluctantly, in the landmark decision in KartarSingh v. State of
Punjab.?2 The majority judicial opinion expressed in the case seems to suggest a
movement towards attaching greater acceptability to confessions made in police
custody, or at any rate the prioritising of national security, and the need to punish
and consequently avert acts of terrorism in India, over the formulaic principles
of inadmissibility of confessions. Inferring any generic metamorphosis in judicial
reasoning from the aforesaid would, however, be fallacious, especially in light of
the partially dissenting opinions in the case, as well as subsequent judicial
decisions, which have expressed concern regarding rendering confessions to
police officers admissibleY Hence from a survey of commentaries and an analysis
of case law, it can be concluded that in India, confessions in the custody of a
police officer are, on principle, barred because there is a presumption of them
being forced. Through these provisions the Legislature has aimed at achieving
the end of primarily thwarting police excesses, which is considered to suffice in
making confessions more reliable. In United Kingdom, however, a different route
of resolution has been taken, by burdening the prosecution with the onus of
proving the fairness of proceedings, instead of by curbing police power. While the
approaches may be divergent, in the opinion of the author, the end to be achieved
is singular a balance between respect for procedure and public interest in
punishment of the guilty.

IV. FRUITS

OF AN INADMISSIBLE CONFESSION3 4

An equally important concept, which raises significant questions regarding
the equilibrium sought to be achieved between respect for procedural regularity
and substantive justice, relates to confirmation of parts of confessional statements
by subsequently discovered facts. The issue involved as far as discovery of facts
as a result of confessional statements is concerned, is whether these facts, if
subsequently proven true, can be admissible, thereby lending credence to at

authority and sufficient in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused
person grounds which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that
by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal
nature in reference to the proceedings against him.
(1994) 3 S.C.C. 569.
3

See ParliamentAttack, supra note 3, at 111o (P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.).
This term is inspired by the doctrine of "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" developed in
the context of the exclusionary rule in the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See, McCORMICK ON EvnmENCE 498-5o6 (Edward Cleary ed., 1984).
40
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least a significant part of the confession made35 British judicial history on the
issue of admitting facts gleaned from confessions is substantial. 6 P.A.C.E. has
borrowed the gist of these common law decisions, and concretised the law insofar
as admissibility of subsequent facts is concerned?7 According to this formulation,
though a confession may be wholly or partly excluded, the same shall not affect
the admissibility of any facts discovered as a consequence of the confession.38 In
the opinion of the author, the legislation has been unequivocal in the words used,
and has strayed away from ambiguous standards such as -strictly relates" or
"distinctly relates" whose prevalence in common law is rampant. By allowing the
fruits of a confession to be admitted the legislators have shown a distinct propensity
towards securing the public interest of punishing the guilty, and not permitting
them to seek refuge behind a procedural rampart.
In India, section 27, I.E.A.,3 which is the analogous provision, is founded
on the principle that the discovery of a fact as a consequence of the confession,
35

A strong argument in favour of admitting subsequently discovered facts has been
put forward by several authors. According to this view, as a general rule, evidence
discovered through confession should be admissible, irrespective of the evidentiary
status of the confession itself, unless there is proof to show the judge that the facts
have been obtained in circumstances running, contrary to the well-enshrined
principle of fairness. However, doubts still remain over the admissibility of the
confession (or part of it) because mere confirmation of a subsequent fact is not enough
to test the veracity of the entire confession, since the reasons as to why certain
confessions are barred are not limited to a lack of truthfulness alone. See generally A.
Gotlieb, Confirmation by Subsequent Facts, 72 LAw

36

Leach C.C. 263 and R.

3
38

Q.

REv.

209 (1956).

The earliest view espoused was that subsequent facts completely dissociated with the
confession would be admissible as was held in the cases of R. v. Warickshall, 1783 1

v. Berriman, (1844) 6 Cox C.C. 388. The consequent

development of the law which took place in common law, was to admit subsequent
facts which would thereby verify only a part of the confession. This part of the
confession would then become admissible, as it would be creditworthy, whereas the
rest of the confession would remain out of bounds for the court. See R. v. Thurtell
(unreported) and R. v. Harris (unreported) cited from Gotlieb, id. at 218.
Subsequently, this test was subtly modified to allow evidence only of subsequent
facts and so much of the confessions as strictly relates to the facts. See R. v. Griffin
(unreported) and R. v. Butcher (unreported) cited from Gotlieb, id. at 22o. This
proposition of common law was finally supplanted by P.A.C.E. in 1984.
P.A.C.E., § 76 (4), (5) and (6), supra note 1o.
However by virtue of § 76(5), P.A.C.E., evidence of the causal link between the
discovery of the fact and any excluded confession cannot be raised by the prosecution,
unless this evidence of the manner of its discovery is provided by the defence.
L9IE.A., § 27:

Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of
information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody
of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a
41
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verifies its contents, thereby rebutting the presumption of taint. Hence, the

relevant part of the confession distinctly relating to the subsequently discovered
facts can be admitted.40 Since this acts as a proviso to the preceding sections,4' its
ambit is restricted, and it is applicable only on the fulfilment of certain
requirements, viz, there must be discovery of a relevant fact in consequence of
information received from the accused; the discovery of such facts must be
deposed to; at the time of receiving the information the accused must be in police
custody; only that part of the information relating distinctly to the fact discovered
and deposed to is admissible."
Certain terms used in section 27 warrant consideration to understand the

scope of this exception to the "inadmissibility of confession" rule. The term "fact
discovered" includes not only the physical object, but also the knowledge of the
accused regarding the place from which it was producedAl This fact discovered,
which must be deposed to, must also be a consequence of the confession of the
accused person." Hence it should be a discovery which would not have been

confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may
be proved.
* The rationale behind the section was explained by Sir John Beaumont J. in Pulukuri
Kottaya v. Emperor, A.IR. 1947 P.C. 67, 70. He said:

4

The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually
discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded
thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely
allowed to be given in evidence.
The early cases seem to indicate that judicial opinion favoured holding § 27 as a
proviso to § 26 only. See Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v. Bhajoo Majhi,
A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 291; Debiram v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1962 Punj. 70. However,
the Supreme Court has subsequently held that § 27 is an exception to § 25 and § 26.
See State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 18o8; State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1125. The 18 5 h Law Commission
Report has gone a step further and stated that § 27 must be regarded as an exception
to § 24 as well, except when the facts are "discovered by threat, coercion, violence or
torture." See lAw CommssioN oF INDiA, 1850, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE INMN EvIDENCE Act
167 (2003).
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4

See generally, Md. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 483.
Md. mayatullah, id.; Pulukuri Kottaya, supra note 40.
Deoman Upadhyaya, supra note 41, at 1128-1129. In this case it was held that since
§ 27 is an exception to the preceding sections, the term "'accused of an offence" must
be construed widely. The reasoning is that § 25 is not restricted only to the accused,
and applies equally to any other person in custody of a police officer. Since § 27 is an
exception to § 25, the term 'accused of an offence" has to be construed widely to
include not only those who have been formally charged with the offence, at the time
of making the confession, but also those who are subsequently so charged.
42
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possible had it not been for the information received from the accused person,
and proof of this must be led.5 Further, the clause "relates distinctly" marks a
shift from the term in the original provision, which called for a strict relation
between the confession and the subsequent discovery. However, the current
terminology also leads to the conclusion that the fact which is discovered must
indubitably be a consequence of the confession of the accused person.46
A further elucidation of the law contained in section 27 was provided in
State of Uttar Pradeshv. Deoman Upadhyaya,47 where the Supreme Court dealt
with the constitutionality of this provision. In holding section 27 intra vires Article
14 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court opined that this section aims to cover
persons in custody of police officials, where the possibility of an unreliable
confession is considerable. On this basis, it justified the distinction made between
such persons and those not in custody.
Though the British and Indian provisions on the fruits of a confession may
be different in form, in the opinion of the author, they are strikingly similar in
substance. The underlying principle behind both laws is to ensure that the
prosecution is not deprived of crucial evidence just because it forms part of a
tainted (either presumptively or in actuality) confession of the accused. If these
facts were to be excluded as evidence, then a comprehensive but suspect
confession would be rendered an antithesis to its own object, as it would hinder
prosecution rather than assist it. However, in the opinion of the author, in India,
the perpetuation of such an exception is largely contingent on the general principle
of confessions being considered inadmissible. If the general principle is removed,
then concurrently the scope and application of section 27 too will be limited to
only those situations where the prosecution fails to adequately discharge its
burden of proving the non-employment of torture or other illegal methods to
obtain the confession.

V.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, any change in the law relating to confessions in India
must be seen through the dual prisms of the need to outlaw torture in police
stations, and simultaneously maintain the balance between the interests in
4'i

Pohaya Motya Vlavi v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1949; Md. Inayatullah,
supra note

42;

Chandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1574.

Thus only that portion of the confessional statement of the accused will be admitted,
as has been proved true by the consequent discovery of fact and not the entire
confession itself. See Md. Inayatullah,supra note 42.
47 AI.R. 196o S.C. 1125.

46
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convicting the guilty on the one hand, and respecting rules of procedure on the
other. The former can be achieved by diligently implementing a sacrosanct code
of practice, akin to that in the United Kingdom. Violations of such a code by police
officers ought to invite the strictest internal censure, including dismissal from
service. A deterrent of this nature will certainly go a long way in reforming police
practices in the country. It will create a more responsible police force that restrains
itself from the use of coercive tactics, if not out of respect for the rights of the
accused, then for its own material concerns. Secondly, as far as the issue of
respecting procedural regularity vis-h-vis convicting the guilty is concerned, it
may be feared that the repercussion of restraining the police force, may be a
further reduction of the already abysmal conviction rate in India. However, if
together with curbing reprehensible police practices, there is a primafacie
presumption drawn in favour of the legality of police action in recording
confessions, the balance between substantive justice and procedural regularity
would be maintained. This must be coupled with placing the burden on the
prosecution to prove voluntariness of a confession and the non-employment of
torture, oppression and any other form of degrading treatment, which would be
necessary for sustaining this presumption. This would also imply that the
admissibility of particular confessions in police custody would be judged on a
case-by-case basis, instead of being enshrined as an inviolable rule. Such a change
in the law, quite apart from fulfilling any instrumental rationales and assisting
chances of prosecution, is required primarily on principle, for if the necessary
safeguards for ensuring voluntariness and credibility are effectuated, there is no
logical reason as to why statements made to police officers should still be the
subject of differential treatment and be considered inadmissible. The United
Kingdom, by taking the lead in this regard, has shown that reforming police
practices and the consequent changing of mindsets of persons towards the police
force, is a gradual process, and is not beyond the purview of the law. Introducing
such an amendment to the law in India would analogously be a move away from
antiquity. Thus, it is expedient that this change be effected.
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